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Admission of Polygraph Results: A Due Process
Perspective
Evidence of polygraph results is generally inadmissible in both
state and federal courts.' The current refusal to admit polygraph
evidence originated in decisional law, beginning with a 1923 case,
Frye v. United States,2 where the District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals rejected expert testimony concerning results3 obtained
using a primitive lie detector.' The reason for exclusion was the lack
of general acceptance of the detection technique within.the appro-
priate profession or field of science.5 Modem courts often cite this
lack of reliability, as viewed from the perspective of the involved
profession or scientific community, when refusing to admit poly-
graph results.'
Contemporary polygraph proponents attempt to lay a foundation
showing the evolution of the technique toward greater accuracy, and
thus to avoid the Frye exclusionary principle.7 There seems to be a
trend, at least in dicta, toward acknowledging the increased reliabil-
' C. McCoRMICK, McCoRMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 207 (Cleary ed. 1972);
J. REm & F. INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEPTION: THE POLYGRAPH ("LIE DETECTOR") TECHNIQUE 309
(2d ed. 1977); Comment, The Truth About the Lie Detector in Federal Court, 51 TmnL L.
Q. 69, 72 n.13, 94 (1978); Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 1306 (1952) (Later Case Serv. 1970 & Supp.
1978).
A common exception is their use through stipulation prior to testing. The leading case
articulating stipulation requirements is People v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962).
See J. REm & F. INHAU, supra at 309, 325; Axelrod, The Use of Lie Detectors by Criminal
Defense Attorneys, 3 NAT'L J. CRIm. DEF. 107, 138 n.105 (1977); Note, The Polygraph Revis-
ited: An Argument For Admissibility, 4 Suffolk U L. Rev. 111, 115 (1969); Annot., 53
A.L.R.3d 1005 (1973 & Supp. 1979).
2 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
3 Id. at 1014.
1 The systolic blood pressure test utilized by Marston is concededly a far cry from the
sophisticated devices in use today. See generally Moenssens, Polygraph Test Results Meet
Standards For Admissibility As Evidence, in LEGAL ADmIsmmTY OF THE POLYGRAPH 14, 20
(N. Ansley ed. 1975). For a concise and critical description of William Marston and his
technique see Axelrod, supra note 1, at 110-13. For a general description of his own work see
W. MARSTON, THE Lm DETECTOR TEST (1938).
5 293 F. at 1014. The development of the exclusionary principle has been exhaustively
treated elsewhere. See, e.g., J. REI & F. INBAU, supra note 1, at 310; Abbell, Polygraph
Evidence: The Case Against Admissibility in Federal Criminal Trials, 15 Am. Cmi. L. Rv.
29, 30 (1977); Abrams, Polygraph Today, 3 NAT'L J. Clns. DEF. 85, 86 (1977). Virtually all
polygraph cases and commentaries discuss this evolution. Axelrod, supra note 1, at 138-40.
See Comment, supra note 1, at 77 n.34 (collecting cases).
See, e.g., United States v. Wainright, 413 F.2d 796, 803 (10th Cir. 1969); People v. Davis,
343 Mich. 348, 72 N.W.2d 269 (1955); People v. Leone, 25 N.Y.2d 511, 307 N.Y.S.2d 430, 255
N.E.2d 696 (1969); C. McCoRMICK, supra note 1, § 207 n.7.
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ity of the modern lie detector.' Most courts have rejected the evi-
dence at preliminary stages despite this threshold demonstration of
trustworthiness;' a minority, however, have been persuaded to
admit. 0
In related attempts to facilitate admission, intercessors have
urged that the expert pool from which Frye requires acceptance be
particularized to include polygraph examiners only." The commen-
tators have also suggested that the general acceptance test be re-
placed by, or merged into, a balancing endeavor conducted by the
trial judge; weighing the probity of the polygraph evidence against
its counterweights-time, prejudice and confusion. 2 A few courts
have attempted similar inquiries under the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence with varying results. 3 It suffices to note that most jurisdic-
tions continue to exclude polygraph evidence in non-stipulation
cases 4 despite vigorous assaults by commentators and the polygra-
phy community. 5
United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 166 (8th Cir. 1975):
It is true that a limited number of federal district courts have sanctioned the
admission of such evidence in certain situations and under limited circumstan-
ces. However, the disposition of these particular cases on appeal would dispel
any conception of a "trend" toward unqualified admissibility in federal courts
at the present time.
See Comment, supra note 1, at 73 n.15.
See, e.g., United States v. Oliver, 525 F.2d 731, 738 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
973 (1976) (where the court rejected polygraph testimony despite expert estimate of over 90%
reliability); Comment, supra note 1, at 80 n.48.
10 See, e.g., United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972); State v. Dorsey,
88 N.M. 184, 539 P.2d 204 (1975); see generally J. RmD & F. INBAU, supra note 1, at 316-21;
Axelrod, supra note 1, at 138; Note, The Emergence of the Polygraph at Trial, 73 COLUM. L.
REv. 1120 nn.4,5 (1973).
" See, e.g., Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (No. 1), 365 Mass. 421, 313 N.E.2d 120 (1974);
People v. Williams, 164 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 858, 331 P.2d 251 (1958); J. RaD & F. INBAU, supra
note 1, at 309 n.2; Axelrod, supra note 1, at 140 n.116, 144 n.129.
12 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 204; see also Note, supra note 10, at 1120, 1139 n.120.
11 For a favorable balance admitting polygraph evidence see United States v. Ridling, 350
F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972); United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685, 691 (D.D.C. 1972),
rev'd without opinion, 475 F.2d 1280 (D.C.Cir. 1972). But see United States v. Flores, 540
F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Marshall, 526 F.2d 1349, 1360 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d
741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Urquidez, 356 F. Supp. 1363, 1367 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
The commentators are scattered in protean array with disagreement regarding the nature
of the issue presented and the proper disposition of the appropriate question. See, e.g., C.
McCormick, supra note 1, § 207; Axelrod, supra note 1, at 137 n.100; Romero, The Admissibil-
ity of Scientific Evidence Under the New Mexico and Federal Rules of Evidence, 6 N.M.L.
Riv. 187, 188 n.7 (1975).
"d See note 1 supra.
15 See, e.g., Cureton, A Consensus as to the Validity of Polygraph Procedures, 22 TENN. L.
Rav. 728 (1953); Dabrowski, The Polygraph Revisited: An Argument for Admissibility, 6
CaM. L. BuLL. 63 (1970); Ferguson, Polygraph v. Outdated Precedent, 35 TEx. B.J. 531
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This note will articulate a due process rationale for admissibility
of polygraph results when offered by a criminal defendant to indi-
cate his belief in his own innocence."6 This constitutional argument
rests upon an interpretive reading of Chambers v. Mississippi 7 and
its progeny.'
Chambers v. Mississippi
In Chambers v. Mississippi,19 the Supreme Court made what ap-
peared to some commentators and defense advocates to be a signifi-
cant procedural due process determination.2' The reverberations of
Chambers are just beginning to shake the evidentiary bastions of
state and federal trial courts. 2'
Chambers involved the exclusion of evidence critical to a crimi-
nal defendant by a Mississippi trial judge. The accused sought to
cross-examine a witness, Gable McDonald, whom he had called.
McDonald had previously confessed to the murder for which
(1972). The polygraph community has waged a frontal assault on admission barriers ranging
from reasoned persuasion, see J. REm & F. INH^u, supra note 1, through concerted advocacy,
see LEGAL ADMISSrIEB OF THE POLYGRAPH, (N. Ansley ed. 1975) (a volume designed "to carry
the attack to our detractors," Weir, Introduction, id. at IX); to unbridled onslaught on the
judicial system, see R. FERGUSON & A. MiLzR, POLYGRAPH FOR THE DEFENSE (1974).
" It is an accepted premise among polygraph experts that only the subject's beliefs are
reflected in his responses and that any psychological deviation from reality will not be re-
corded accurately. See J. REm & F. INBAu, supra note 1, at 228, 247-50; Abbel, supra note 5,
at 37-38 n.33; Burkey, The Case Against the Polygraph, 51 A.B.A.J. 855, 856 (1965); Note,
supra note 10, at 1123 n.16. For a discussion of the uses for which polygraphy evidence may
be relevant see notes 92-97 & accompanying text infra.
IT 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
" See, e.g., Hughes v. Matthews, 576 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 43 (1978);
United States v. Benveniste, 564 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1977); Welcome v. Vincent, 549 F.2d 853
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 911 (1977); Johnson v. Brewer, 521 F.2d 556 (8th Cir. 1975);
Steinmark v. Parratt, 427 F. Supp. 931 (D. Neb. 1977). See also United States v. Melchor
Moreno, 536 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Goodlow, 500 F.2d 954 (8th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Torres, 477 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1973). But see United States v. Corr, 543 F.2d
1042 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Hughes, 529 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Pena, 527 F.2d 1356 (5th Cir. 1976); Maness v. Wainright, 512 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
dismissed, 430 U.S. 550 (1977).
" 410. U.S. 284 (1973).
See, e.g., Imwinkefried, The Constitutional Right to Present Defense Evidence, 62 MIL.
L. Rzv. 225, 227, 267 (1973); Wynn, A Due Process Challenge to Restrictions on the Substan-
tive Use of Evidence of a Rape Prosecutrix's Prior Sexual Conduct, 9 U.C.D.L. REv. 443
(1976); Note, Limitations on the Right to Introduce Evidence Pertaining to the Prior Sexual
Conduct of the Complaining Witness in cases of Forcible Rape: Reflection of Reality or Denial
of Due Process?, 3 HoFSTRA L. Rav. 403 (1975); Note, Chambers v. Mississippi: Due Process
and the Rules of Evidence, 35 U. Prrr. L. REv. 725 (1974); 62 ILL. B.J. 158, 159 (1973).
21 Prior to Chambers v. Mississippi it was generally assumed that courts and legislatures
regulated evidentiary rules, 29 AM. JuR. 2d Evidence § 9 (1967); Imwinkelreid, supra note
20, at 227, without considering a defendant's constitutional rights. See cases collected note
13 supra. See also State v. Dorsey, 88 N.M. 184, 539 P.2d 204 (1975).
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Chambers was being tried. The trial court denied the motion to
examine McDonald as an adverse witness, because he had not
"point[ed] the finger at Chambers. ' 22 The defendant then at-
tempted to introduce the testimony of three witnesses, all of whom
were prepared to swear that McDonald had confessed the crime to
them individually. The trial court rejected these offers as hearsay.
The Supreme Court of Mississippi upheld the trial court's eviden-
tiary rulings on appeal.2
Justice Powell outlined the resulting situation succinctly:
As a consequence of the combination of Mississippi's "party
witness" or "voucher" rule and its hearsay rule, he was unable
either to cross-examine McDonald or to present witnesses in his
own behalf who would have discredited McDonald's repudiation
and demonstrated his complicity. . . .Chambers' defense was
far less persuasive than it might have been given an opportunity
to subject McDonald's statements to cross-examination or had
the other confessions been admitted .2
Then, addressing the effect of those rulings on Chambers' constitu-
tional rights, Justice Powell observed:
The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is,
in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the
State's accusations. The rights to confront and cross-examine
witnesses and to call witnesses in one's own behalf have long
been recognized as essential to due process. 2
Focusing first on the trial court's denial of Chambers' move to
cross-examine McDonald, the Court declared:
The right of cross-examination is more than a desirable rule
of trial procedure. It is implicit in the constitutional right of
confrontation. . . .It is, indeed, "an essential and fundamental
requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country's
constitutional goal." Of course, the right to confront and to
cross-examine is not absolute and may, in appropriate cases,
bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal
trial process. . . .But its denial or significant diminution calls
into question the ultimate "integrity of the fact-finding process"
and requires that the competing interest be closely examined."
When Mississippi's voucher rule was judged by the standard enun-
ciated it was found seriously deficient. The Court emphasized the
410 U.S. at 292.
Id. at 293 (citing Chambers v. State, 252 So. 2d 217, 220 (Miss. 1971)).
2 Id. at 294 (emphasis added).
21 Id. (emphasis added).
21 Id. at 295 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 55:157
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anachronistic nature of the voucher rule and its potential for sub-
verting "the truthgathering process." 27 The state's complete failure
to defend or explain the underlying rule or to bring it into the cate-
gory of a legitimate state interest which might "override the ac-
cused's right of confrontation 28 was accentuated. Finally, Justice
Powell rejected Mississippi's argument that there was "no incom-
patibility between the rule and Chambers' rights because no right
of confrontation exists unless the testifying witness is 'adverse' to
the accused, "29 noting:
It can hardly be disputed that McDonald's testimony was in
fact seriously adverse to Chambers . . We reject the notion
that a right of such substance in the criminal process may be
governed by [a] technicality. . . . The "voucher" rule, as ap-
plied in this case, plainly interfered with Chambers' right to
defend against the State's charges."'
Turning to the trial court's refusal to allow Chambers the oppo-
tunity to offer the testimony of three witnesses concerning McDon-
ald's alleged confessions, the Court criticized Mississippi's adher-
ence to a hearsay exception limited to declarations against pecuni-
ary interest. They acknowledged the scholarly debate over declara-
tions against penal interests and the arguments often raised against
the reliability of such evidence, but pointed out the assurances of
trustworthiness in the particular circumstances of Chambers and
observed that McDonald was available in court to answer those
charges before a jury.3" The Court concluded that:
Few rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to
present witnesses in his own defense .... In the exercise of this
right, the accused, as is required of the State, must comply with
established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure
both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and
innocence. Although perhaps no rule of evidence has been more
respected or more frequently applied in jury trials than that
applicable to the exclusion of hearsay, exceptions tailored to
allow the introduction of evidence which in fact is likely to be
trustworthy have long existed. The testimony rejected by the
trial court here bore persuasive assurances of trustworthiness
and thus was well within the basic rationale of the exception for
declarations against interest. That testimony also was critical to
Id. at 296 n.8.
2s Id. at 297.
23 Id.
11 Id. at 297-98.
'1 Id. at 299-301.
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Chambers' defense. In these circumstances, where constitu-
tional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are
implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically
to defeat the ends of justice. 32
In combination, the Mississippi trial court's application of its
traditional voucher and hearsay rules were found to have deprived
Leon Chambers of his due process rights. 3 Therefore, the Supreme
Court reversed and remanded the case.
APPLYING AND EXTENDING Chambers IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
Chambers' ratio decidendi precluded the Mississippi trial court's
application of its traditional voucher and hearsay rules from depriv-
ing the criminal defendant of an opportunity to confront an ob-
viously adverse witness effectively, and from excluding probative
evidence tending to inculpate another. The Court reasoned that the
circumstantial trustworthiness of the rejected testimony, coupled
with the critical position the cumulative exclusionary rulings occu-
pied in his attempted defense, required the trial court to allow such
a presentation to comport with Chambers' due process rights. The
conventional evidentiary rules in this peculiar fact situation were
suspened l4 because the policy underlying those canons was insuffi-
ciently compelling to overbalance the defendant's due process
rights.3 5
Chambers seemed to reflect a trend toward opening up the fact-
3 Id. at 302 (emphasis added).
13 Id. at 302-03. Then, seeking to limit the holding, the Court cautioned:
In reaching this judgment, we establish no new principles of constitutional law.
Nor does our holding signal any diminution in the respect traditionally accorded
to the States in the establishment and implementation of their own criminal
trial rules and procedures. Rather, we hold quite simply that under the facts and
circumstances of this case the rulings of the trial court deprived Chambers of a
fair trial.
Id.
d* The Court did not find Mississippi's evidentiary rules unconstitutional per se but only
as applied, 410 U.S. at 302-03. See generally 62 ILL. B.J. 158, 159 (1973).
' The Chambers court expressly recognized the state's right to control its judicial process,
but refused to allow the mechanistic application of evidentiary rules to defeat a defendant's
right to a just ascertainment of guilt. 410 U.S. at 302-03. The Court did not articulate
Mississippi's interest in maintaining its rules in general, but specifically criticized the exclu-
sionary rules invoked as outmoded and inappropriate in the instant case. Id. at 296-97, 298-
301. It is interesting to note that Mississippi did not seek to establish its interest in the
voucher rule, id. at 297, and that there is nothing in the opinion to indicate that Mississippi
sought to defend its interest in its hearsay rules, but the Supreme Court's criticism of the
two rules implies that the rationale of the rule must be sound if a state's policy is ever to be
sufficiently compelling to withstand constitutional attack.
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finding process. Justice Powell's criticisms of Mississippi's
"'voucher' rule . . .[which] appears to be a remnant of primitive
English trial practice," and its "materialistic limitation on the dec-
laration against interest, '"" left little doubt that stagnant eviden-
tiary rules would be closely scrutinized if they clash with the evolv-
ing concept of due process. By subtly synthesizing criminal proce-
dure, evidence and constitutional law,37 Chambers put the legal
community on notice that exclusionary rules would be subject to
stricter review where they conflict with a criminal defendant's due
process rights and the jurisdiction's justification for exclusion is not
sufficiently compelling.
Subsequent federal' decisions hesitated to employ a similar due
process evaluation due to the narrowness of the holding, which em-
phasized Chambers' peculiar facts. 8 The due process argument was
raised in various contexts,39 with vindication of the defendant's
rights urged only in dissent. 0 Finally, however, breakthroughs oc-
curred in federal and state courts, and diverse evidentiary barriers
were breached when the specific care demanded."
1' 410 U.S. at 299. See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56
F.R.D. 183, 217 (1973); FED. R. Evm. 402, Advisory Committee Note: "[C]ongressional
enactments in the field of evidence have generally tended to expand admissibility beyond the
scope of the common law rules . . . ."; C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 81 (1954); J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, Preface (3d ed. 1940); Note, supra note 10, at 1120, 1138.
Many states have recognized the need for broader acceptance of relevant evidence. See,
e.g., UNIFORM RuLEs OF Evm., Commissioner's Prefatory Note (1974); N.M.R. EvID. The New
Mexico Rules were patterned on the Federal Rules as were the 1974 UNIFORM RULES OF EVID.
" Imwinkelreid, supra note 20, at 267.
See, e.g., United States v. Corr, 543 F.2d 1042 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Hughes,
529 F.2d 839, (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Pena, 527 F.2d 1356 (5th Cir. 1976); Maness
v. Wainwright, 512 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 430 U.S. 550 (1977); Greenfield
v. Robinson, 413 F. Supp. 1113 (W.D. Va. 1976); 53 WAsH. L. REV. 319, 324 n.26, 325 (1978).
1, See, e.g., United States v. Pena, 527 F.2d 1356 (5th Cir. 1976) (finding that the declara-
tions against interest offered were not reliable enough to admit under a Chambers analysis
and that mere favorableness to the defense is not dispositive in a due process sense); accord,
United States v. Homer, 545 F.2d 864 (3d Cir. 1976).
,o See Maness v. Wainwright, 512 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 430 U.S. 550
(1977). "As I perceive the due process principle announced in Chambers, it commands that
every material source of evidence as to what was said and done by the principle players in
this domestic tragedy should be laid before the triers of fact." Id. at 93 (Clark, J., dissenting).
"1 See, e.g., Welcome v. Vincent, 549 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 911 (1977).
In United States v. Torres, 477 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1973) reversible error occurred where the
district court refused to allow the defendant to impeach his own witness by introducing
relevant and crucial evidence of that witness' prior conviction. Note that this was a criminal
prosecution within the federal jurisdiction so that no question of a state's interest arose. The
Ninth Circuit partially relied on Chambers v. Mississippi in its holding. Id. at 924.
In United States v. Goodlow, 500 F.2d 954 (8th Cir. 1974), exclusion of the unavailable
declarant's declarations against penal interest was reversible error. This is another federal
case where the Eighth Circuit cited Chambers to bolster its evidentiary ruling but found it
1979]
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A notable extension of the Chambers doctrine took place in
Welcome v. Vincent.42 The Second Circuit ordered that a writ of
habeas corpus should issue for a defendant whose due process right
to cross-examine a defense witness had been violated by the state
trial court, which had relied on New York's voucher rule. The court
phrased the issue: "Our question, of course, is not whether the re-
fusal to permit the desired cross-examination was erroneous as an
evidentiary matter, but whether it deprived appellant of a funda-
mentally fair trial in violation of the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment"4 3 and noted: "In resolving the fair trial issue,
our starting point must be the Supreme Court's decision in
Chambers v. Mississippi.""
The defendant in Welcome sought to elicit a prior inconsistent
statement during cross-examination, which would inculpate the
defense witness, thereby exculpating the accused.45 The Second Cir-
cuit acknowledged Chambers' limitation to its own facts, but recog-
nized the fundamental nature of the defendant's due prpcess right
of cross-examination." Furthermore, the court found that right dis-
positive where, as in Chambers, the defense would have been far
more persuasive had the evidence been admitted.4 7 Significantly,
they upheld the defendant's right despite the district court's doubts
concerning the reliability of the proffered evidence and the lack of
the cumulative evidentiary exclusion which the Chambers' court
emphasized.48
unnecessary to invoke the fifth amendment's due process clause since it rested its holding on
evidentiary grounds. Id. at 958.
In United States v. Melchor Moreno, 536 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1976), the Fifth Circuit
invoked Chambers' principles to balance the fifth amendment rights of a subpoenaed witness
against the sixth amendment and due process rights of an accused, who sought to elicit that
witness' testimony when the district judge insufficiently scrutinized the recalcitrant witness'
claim.
See also State v. Dorsey, 88 N.M. 184, 539 P.2d 204 (1975); Kreisher v. State, - Del.
- 303 A.2d 651 (1973); State v. Dickinson, - La. -, 282 So. 2d 456 (1973); Common-
wealth v. Hackett, 225 Pa. Super. Ct. 22, 307 A.2d 337 (1973). For a discussion of Dorsey see
notes 58-68 & accompanying text infra.
42 549 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1977).





" [Chambers] value in the instant case is further diluted by the fact that, by
virtue of the hearsay testimony excluded there, the Supreme Court did not have
to decide, as we must now, whether a significant restriction on a defendant's
examination of a witness who has confessed to the crime is alone enough to deny
the defendant a fair trial. The Supreme Court . . . stated that the criminal
defendant's right of cross-examination is of vital importance.
[Vol. 55:157
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While Welcome reflected the evolution of Chambers' due process
doctrine it focused solely on the defendant's right to cross-examine.
Subsequently, in United States v. Benveniste,4" the Ninth Circuit
recognized the defendant's right to present witnesses. Thus, the
Ninth Circuit extended Chambers' treatment of that fundamental
right to constitutional status by itself where the requisite reliability
and criticality factors were present."
Benveniste dealt with the federal district court's denial of a crimi-
nal defendant's offer of a declaration against the penal interest of a
witness who was unavailable at trial after invoking her fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination.5' The purpose of the offer
was to discredit the government informant's testimony regarding
the defendant's predisposition to traffic in drugs.12 The informant's
credibility was potentially crucial to the jury's decision on the en-
trapment defense. 5 Thus, the court, quoting Chambers, found that
exclusion made the defense "far less persuasive than it might have
been!' and deprived the accused of exculpatory evidence which he
was constitutionally entitled to present.54
This situation clearly satisfied Chambers' criticality element and
the court easily negotiated the remaining reliability hurdle. In ex-
amining the offered evidence the Ninth Circuit utilized Rule
804(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence5" to find sufficient trust-
worthiness to admit under a Chambers analysis.56
Id. (emphasis added). Welcome's inability to bring Cunningham's confession before the jury
on direct or indirect examination was not as damaging as it might have been since Cun-
ningham, when called by the defense, "testified, rather remarkably" as to his prior
"confession." Id. at 856. Thus, the significance of the trial court's exclusion was even less than
the Chambers trial court's imposition of Mississippi's voucher rule by itself.
" 564 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1977).
1* The court did not consider the federal government's justification for exclusion. See note
41 supra; notes 149-60 & accompanying text infra.
1, 564 F.2d at 338. The sought-after witness refused to testify after the government declined
to grant her immunity.
52 The Ninth Circuit defined its entrapment standard as "whether the Government officials
implant[ed] in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense
and induce[d] its commission in order that they may prosecute," id. at 340, before consider-
ing the effect of the exclusionary ruling.
Id. at 342.
3' Id.
" (3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its
making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or
so far tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a
claim by him against another, that a reasonable man in his position would not
have made the statement unless he believed it to be true.
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
1, 564 F.2d at 341.
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Read together, Welcome and Benveniste demonstrate the applic-
ability of a Chambers due process analysis to different fact situa-
tions. Both courts extended Chambers by finding a due process
violation without cumulative evidentiary exclusions. Neither court
dealt with assurances of trustworthiness as persuasive as those in
Chambers. The Welcome court upheld the right to cross-examine in
a factual setting wherein the critical nature of that evidence was
diluted, and Benveniste ignored the Chambers' balancing of the
rights of the accused against the government's interest in exclusion.
The common thread among the three cases was the judicial realiza-
tion that the trial court had excluded arguably reliable evidence,
thereby rendering the defense "far less persuasive than it might
have been," for no legitimate governmental reasons.
DuE PROCESS AND ADMISSION OF POLYGRAPH RESULTS: THE NEW
MEXICO APPROACH
Extrapolation from this Chambers line of cases to polygraph ex-
clusions suggests that when polygraph results are found to be reli-
able and to occupy a critical position in the accused's defense, he
has a due process right to present those results absent a valid, and
sufficiently compelling, state justification for exclusion.
Due process challenges to the universal exclusion of polygraph
results have been suggested by legal writers since Chambers57 and,
in at least one state supreme court, upheld, albeit with sparse dis-
cussion. In State v. Dorsey,5" the New Mexico Supreme Court found
that its prior requirements of stipulation or absence of objection to
introduction at trial, upon which admission of polygraph evidence
hinged, was, among other infirmities, "[Ilnconsistent with the con-
cept of due process. "I The court accordingly overruled its prior
decision, State v. Lucero,0 which set forth polygraph admission
51 See, e.g., Axelrod, supra note 1, at 143.
58 88 N.M. 184, 539 P.2d 204 (1975).
51 Id. at 185, 539 P.2d at 205. The court also rejected those requirements because they were:
(1) Mechanistic in nature ...
(3) Repugnant to the announced purpose and construction of the New Mexico
Rules of Evidence that:
"These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration **and
promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the
truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined"; and
(4) Particularly incompatible with the purposes and scope of Rules 401, 402, 702
and 703, N.M.S.A. 1953 (Repl.Vol. 4, Supp. 1973).
Id.
go 86 N.M. 686, 526 P.2d 1091 (1974).
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prerequisites as to those two requirements but retained three others:
"When the court has evidence of the qualifications of the polygraph
operator to establish his expertise; . . .to establish the reliability
of the testing procedure employed as approved by the authorities in
the field; and . . . [t]he validity of the tests made on the sub-
ject,""1 which pertain to the reliability of the evidence.
The court's decision failed to mention Chambers, or to articulate
any due process reasoning. The New Mexico Court of Appeals did
consider Chambers, however, in its Dorsey opinion.12 The court
summarized the Chambers' treatment of the fundamental right to
present witnesses and considered the appropriate conditions for
admissibility on due process grounds. In their opinion, "The United
States Supreme Court held that the statements were made under
circumstances of considerable reliability and were critical to Cham-
bers' defense.""3 Phrasing the issue whether "the two requirements
of Chambers . . .exist in this case," the court accepted the
"unchallenged findings of the trial court" on reliability." The trial
court excluded polygraph testimony because of Lucero's first two
requirements but found its "reliability" portion satisfied by defense
substantiation of their polygraph results offer.
Turning to the criticality issue the Court of Appeals noted that
the prosecutor "did an excellent job of attacking defendant's credi-
bility,"65 and that polygraph evidence corroborating the accused's
testimony "was crucial because the questions and answers go both
to defendant's intent and to the question of provocation, and thus,
under the instructions, to whether defendant committed murder in
the second degree or voluntary manslaughter."66 Thus, the court
found that "[t]he requirements of Chambers . .. were met." 7
Therefore, they effectively suspended Lucero's first two evidentiary
rules because "under the circumstances of this case, the due process
requirement in Chambers v. Mississippi .. .applies." 8 Presum-
ably the Supreme Court of New Mexico incorporated that reasoning
into its terse acknowledgement of Dorsey's due process rights.
The New Mexico approach to admission of polygraph results, as
developed in the Dorsey opinions, suggests a far more enlightened
, 88 N.M. at 185, 539 P.2d at 205.
,2 State v. Dorsey, 87 N.M. 323, 532 P.2d 912 (Ct. App. 1975).
"Id. at 325, 532 P.2d at 914.
"Id.






method of analyzing polygraph reliability, on a case-by-case basis,
than the blanket exclusionary rule utilized in many jurisdictions.
The Dorsey approach provides the trial court with a viable means
of satisfying Chambers' implicit requirement of a determination of
trustworthiness. If the requisite reliability is found the court then
considers whether the facts satisfy the criticality requirement. If
both reliability and criticality factors are sufficient to raise a due
process issue, the court should proceed to analyze the importance
of the state's interest in its exclusionary rule.
The lower court opinion fails to undertake such a balancing of the
defendant's rights versus the state justification for exclusion. The
Supreme Court, however, merely abrogated its own exclusionary
rule. Dual interrelated rationales for rejecting Lucero's require-
ments may be discerned through careful scrutiny of the opinion.
First, the court hinted that exclusion absent stipulation or lack of
prosecutorial objection was unreasonable because it denied the
fact-finding process useful information, thereby inhibiting the
"growth and development of the law of evidence." 9 This attitude
reflects Chambers' concept of an evolving truthgathering process.
Second, the Dorsey court may have perceived the anomalous posi-
tion of a court which accepts evidence when both sides stipulate,
or when the prosecution fails to object, but rejects the same evi-
dence when offered by the criminal defendant absent the prosecu-
tion's waiver. Such a rule might well fail to withstand a Chambers
scrutiny for legitimacy, since it arbitrarily rejects testimony con-
sidered sufficiently reliable to admit for the same purpose, if the
state waives its objections.
EXPANDING Chambers
While the New Mexico approach reaches a proper result, the
Dorsey opinions do not deal with the polygraph opponents' argu-
ments regarding its lack of reliability or other dangers inherent in
its use as evidence. The remainder of this note will dispose of those
criticisms and concatenate the ratiocination of Chambers and its
progeny with the offer of lie detector results by the criminal defen-
dant.
" 88 N.M. 184, 185, 539 P.2d 204, 205 (1975). See note 59 supra.
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The Right to Present Witnesses
An argument for admission of polygraph results on due process
grounds necessarily calls for an expansive reading of Chambers. The
advocate must first overcome Justice Powell's caveat that the deci-
sion need not rest solely on lack of cross-examination opportunity,
since it was the combination of that error with the exclusion of
critical testimony that mandated overruling the Mississippi Su-
preme Court. 0 The Court did, however, characterize the right to
present witnesses as fundamental and crucial to a defendant's due
process.7' Welcome subsequently found that application of the
voucher rule violated a defendant's due process rights even though
that evidentiary ruling was not coupled with another constitutional
abrogation. In Benveniste the Ninth Circuit extended Chambers to
apply where only the witness presentation right was involved, with-
out mentioning the narrowness of Justice Powell's holding.
Other federal courts, while rejecting evidence after lack of trust-
worthiness determinations, have indicated in dicta that the right to
present witnesses is sufficient to invoke a defendant's due process
right to a reasoned review of the offered evidence's reliability and
criticality. 72 Hughes v. Matthews, 73 a Seventh Circuit opinion,
"recognized the due process right of the defendant to present rele-
vant and competent evidence in the absence of a valid state justifi-
cation for excluding such evidence, '7 where a state court had re-
jected psychiatric testimony regarding the defendant's lack of spe-
cific intent to commit murder. The Hughes court found a violation
of the defendant's right to present evidence enough, by itself, to
affirm a writ of habeas corpus issued by the federal district court. 75
In Johnson v. Brewer,76 the Eighth Circuit found that the state's
failure to permit the defense to impeach the government informant
by introducing evidence of his "framing" a defendant in a previous
case, similarly violated the defendant's due process rights by itself.77
Thus, an expansive reading of Chambers has been accepted by
several federal courts. Exclusion of polygraph results based on a
necessity for cumulative evidentiary deprivations should, therefore,
70 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973); accord, Steinmark v. Parratt, 427 F. Supp. 931 (D. Neb. 1977).
"1 410 U.S. at 294, 302.
71 See, e.g., United States v. Satterfield, 572 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Oropeza, 564 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1977).
73 576 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 99 S. Ct. 43 (1978).
7' Id. at 1259.
7' Id. at 1255. See notes 122-31 & accompanying text infra.
7, 521 F.2d 556 (8th Cir. 1975).
n Id. at 562.
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not take place if that evidence can satisfy Chambers' other require-
ments. Assuming that Chambers would find a due process violation
based on the exclusion of testimony by a "mechanistic" application
of the hearsay rule without more, the question of polygraph admissi-
bility becomes one of reliability and criticality.
Reliability of Polygraph Evidence
The question of polygraph reliability has been the subject of vio-
lent disagreement for years.7" If a criminal defendant offers such
evidence which appears to be critical to his defense, a Chambers due
process analysis requires the trial court to evaluate that offer, and
precludes either a "mechanistic" application of the Frye princi-
ple 7-which is as out of date as many voucher and hearsay rules-or
exclusion based on non-reliability grounds similar to the Lucero
requirements rejected in Dorsey.
Federal and state courts ought to adopt a Dorsey-type inquiry
regarding admission of polygraph results. This approach is consis-
tent with their balancing of trustworthiness factors when a declara-
tion against penal interest is offered. 0 Due process considerations
" See, e.g., Holmes, The Degree of Objectivity in Chart Interpretation, ACADEMY LEcruREs
iN LiE DrCTION 62-70 (Leonard ed. 1958) (75% estimate of reliability); Horvath & Reid, The
Reliability of Polygraph Examiner Diagnosis of Truth and Deception, 62 J. CrIM. L.C. & P.S.
276-81 (1971); Sternbach, Gustafson & Colier, Don't Trust the Lie Detector, 40 HARV. Bus.
REv. 127 (1962) (70% estimate of reliability) (based upon Ellson, Davis, Saltzman & Burke,
A Report of Research on Detection of Deception, distributed by the Department of Psychol-
ogy, Indiana University, 1952). See also Burkey, supra note 16, at 856; The Emergence of the
Polygraph, supra note 10, at 1124. Reid and Inbau suggest their known errors are "less than
1 percent," J. REm & F. INBAU, supra note 1, at 304, and include citation to 84 studies of "the
validity of the Polygraph technique and the reliability of the interpretation of Polygraph
charts." Id. at 420-23. They conclude in their own study that in 87.75% of the cases polygraph
examiners could accurately detect guilt or innocence "solely from an analysis of Polygraph
records." Id. at 389, 391-92.
71 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See notes 2-5 & accompanying text
supra.
11 The analogy to declarations against penal interest extends beyond the similarity of the
trustworthiness debate which has surrounded both types of evidence for years. For a discus-
sion of polygraph reliability, see note 78 supra. For discussion of the trustworthiness of
declarations against penal interest see Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 299-300 and
notes 27-30 & accompanying text supra.
Federal courts have begun to devise methods for evaluating the reliability of those declara-
tions. "First, is the statement so contrary to the declarant's interest in avoiding criminal
liability that a reasonable person in declarant's position would not have made the statement
unless he believed it to be true? Second, do corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the
trustworthiness of the statement?" United States v. Oropeza, 564 F.2d 325, 335 (9th Cir. 1977)
(relying on United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244 (1st Cir. 1976) and United States v. Bagley,
537 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1976)). Cf. United States v. DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. 1377, 1384 (S.D.
Cal.), affl'd, 470 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1972) (a polygraph hearing was appropriate and an
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mandate the same approach to lie detector evidence. Jurisdictions
that avoid such evaluations are on notice that the lack of such a
procedure may require reversal of criminal convictions either be-
cause the rules of evidence are unreasonable8 1 or are "mechanisti-
cally" applied.
There are three available procedures through which polygraph
offers may be filtered, before the jury considers that testimony. At
a reliability hearing the court may consider the merits of the partic-
ular evidence and balance its relevancy against the possibility of
prejudicing, misleading, or confusing the jury. Naturally, the prose-
cution has an opportunity to challenge the offer at these stages and
may, if the results are admitted, also debate their worth before the
jury. Ultimately, the judge has occasion to shape the jury's use of
the evidence by instructions.
Since objections based on the lack of trustworthiness are so preva-
lent, an examination of these safeguards of reliability is appropriate.
Relevancy challenges to evidence must also be dealt with whenever
a defendant's right to introduce corroborative polygraph evidence is
in question. Discussion of these issues highlights the unreason-
ableness of a blanket exclusionary rule when less intrusive alterna-
tives are present and exposes the anomaly of allowing admission of
polygraph evidence only by stipulation.
The Reliability Foundation
There is ample precedent for a fair hearing on the validity of
polygraph results. The New Mexico approach allows the judge to
evaluate:
(1) the qualifications of the polygraph expert,
(2) the reliability of the particular testing procedure utilized,
and
(3) the validity of the tests in the particular case.82
arbitrary exclusion was not):
The court concludes only that a polygraph examiner, having satisfied a particu-
lar court that he is qualified as an expert in his field, should be permitted to
present foundational evidence to that court demonstrative of the polygraph's
substantial reliability and acceptance, in an effort to establish its probative
value. . . . The alternative is to continue the unexamined policy of exclusion
of such evidence . . ..
Quoted in Axelrod, supra note 1, at 140 n.116. See also United States v. Oliver, 525 F.2d 731,
736-37 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 973 (1976) (setting reliability requirements for
stipulated evidence).
s See notes 140-49 & accompanying text infra.
S2 State v. Dorsey, 88 N.M. 184, 185, 539 P.2d 204, 205 (1975).
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Many jurisdictions admit the evidence where stipulation is obtained
before the test and the trial judge is satisfied as to reliability after
consideration of issues similar to the New Mexico factors.83 The
prosecution may challenge the offer on any or all of these grounds
at this preliminary stage, 4 and the literature on polygraph admissi-
bility will provide plentiful material for the state's attack on the
trustworthiness of polygraph results. Usually the admission of evi-
dence has been within the trial judge's discretion even where stipu-
lation has occurred." This rule corresponds with the federal court
standard of review of the trial court's exclusion of non-stipulated
polygraph offers" and with the appellate standard for declarations
against penal interest trustworthiness determinations.8 Due process
requires no more than this reasoned inquiry if there is no abuse of
discretion.8 1
Reliability Challenges at Trial
In the stipulation cases it is clear that, where the trial judge has
decided to admit the polygraph results, the prosecution must have
the right to cross-examine the polygraph examiner as to his qualifi-
cations, the testing conditions, the polygraph technique and its in-
herent reliability and "any other matter deemed pertinent to the
inquiry" at the discretion of the trial judge. This opportunity pro-
tects the fact-finding process and the state's interest in efficacious
and fair prosecution of the accused. Naturally, this procedure would
be retained if non-stipulated evidence were admitted on the defen-
dant's behalf.
Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 1005, 1008 (1973 & Supp. 1979).
" Id.
81 For a polygraph evidence opponent's wealth of arguments at the offer and cross-
examination stages see Axelrod, supra note 1, at 146-53.
86 Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 1005, 1008 (1973 & Supp. 1979).
87 See, e.g., United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 203 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 969
(1977); United States v. Flores, 540 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Mayes,
512 F.2d 637, 648 n.6 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1008 (1975); United States v. Lanza,
356 F. Supp. 27, 30 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
88 "Determination of admissibility under Rule 804(b)(3) is left to trial court discretion."
United States v. Oropeza, 564 F.2d 316, 325 (9th Cir. 1977) (citing United States v. Guillette,
547 F.2d 743 (2d Cir. 1976)).
89 See, e.g., United States v. Satterfield, 572 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1978).
80 Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 1005, 1008 (1973 & Supp. 1979). But see State v. Seebold, 111 Ariz.
423, 531 P.2d 1130 (1975) (refusing to allow impeachment of an examiner in a stipulation
case).
[Vol. 55:157
ADMISSION OF POLYGRAPH RESULTS
Jury Instructions
The stipulation cases also require the trial judge to instruct the
jury concerning the proper use of the admitted testimony." Poly-
graph results do not tend to prove or disprove elements of the crime
in the normal situation, and the instruction should contain this
warning. The evidence should be presented only to indicate the
defendant's veracity as to his subjective belief about the matter for
which admission is sought. The trial court's ability to focus the
evidence for the jury at this stage protects the judicial process and
would do so whether or not there were a prior stipulation.
Relevancy
Irrelevant evidence is axiomatically inadmissible.12 Polygraph
evidence is relevant as expert testimony corroborating a defendant's
denial of guilt or explanation of mitigating circumstances. 3 When
it has been screened for reliability, it is useful information for the
fact-finder in assessing the defendant's credibility. 4 Where lie de-
tector results conclusively" demonstrate that the accused subjec-
tively believes his testimony, 8 this relatively reliable evidence ren-
ders his testimonial truthfulness more likely and should be admit-
ted as corroborating evidence. 7
,Id.
, FED. R. Evm. 402; C. MCCORMCK, supra note 1, § 185.
,3 Both Hughes v. Matthews, 576 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1978) and State v. Dorsey, 88 N.M.
184, 539 P.2d 204 (1975) represent examples of courts upholding the due process right of a
defendant to present evidence relevant to the gravity of the crime rather than to the basic
issue of guilt or innocence.
" On reliability inquiries see notes 78-90 & accompanying text supra. On usefulness see
FED. R. Evm. 702, note 116 infra.
Is See State v. Bell, 90 N.M. 134, 138-39, 560 P.2d 925, 929-30 (1977) (post-Dorsey New
Mexico case making clear that even if the proper foundation is laid the polygraph results will
not be admitted if inconclusive as to the defendant's belief in his innocence since such
evidence is irrelevant); N.M.R. EvID. 401, 402.
The prosecutor may challenge the defense polygraph tests on relevancy grounds at the time
of the offer and may present expert testimony, evaluating the standardized test graphs as to
conclusiveness, to demonstrate irrelevancy. For a study evaluating the analysis of polygraph
results, from the graphs themselves, by qualified examiners see J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note
1, 389 app. A-1. If the reliability factors are satisfied, another expert, sponsored by the
prosecution, can examine the particular test for conclusiveness or, as in State v. Bell, the
defense expert may testify that the results were inconclusive. 90 N.M. at 138, 560 P.2d at
929.
1' See note 16 supra.
97 C. McCoRMICK, supra note 1, § 184 on the relevancy standard, "[Tihe most acceptable
test of relevancy is the question, does the evidence offered render the desired inference more
probable than it would be without the evidence?" It is the position of this note that corrobora-
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Commentators have suggested, however, that the crucial issue in
the admissibility of polygraph results debate is the balancing re-
quired by Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which man-
dates weighing the probative value of relevant evidence vis-&-vis the
possibilities of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 8 Most federal
courts, basing their rejection on one or more of the Rule 403 factors,
have struck a balance against admission." So long as the trial
court's relevancy inquiry is as reasoned as the reliability determina-
tion, it might seem that there is no due process mandate to reverse
that ruling. To the extent, however, that the counterweights indi-
cating exclusion are justifications for overriding the defendant's
right to present witnesses, those governmental interests must with-
stand close scrutiny.100
The danger most frequently stressed by polygraph evidence oppo-
nents is the risk of jury overvaluation or confusion in valuation of
polygraph results, which threatens the viability of the fact-finding
process.10' Those commentators have suggested that testimonial
debate over the technique's accuracy is itself destructive of the
jury's reasoned consideration.1 2 Such a justification for exclusion is
undermined by the trial judge's ability to weed out irrelevant evi-
dence '03 and his duty to clarify the use of polygraph evidence at
tive polygraph results enhance the defendant's credibility. For an incisive discussion of rele-
vancy and reliability of polygraph evidence see Romero, supra -note 13, at 200-06.
"FED. R. EvD. 403.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighted [sic] by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 207; See also Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1968), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970).
11 The court in United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1975), for example,
coupled its "doubts about the reliability of polygraphy" with "countervailing policy consider-
ations which militate against the admissibility of unstipulated polygraph evidence at trial."
Id. at 167-68. This implicit factoring was accomplished without mentioning Rule 403 but the
point was unquestionably a fear of jury overvaluation of the results. Id. at 167-70. See also
United States v. Flores, 540 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1976) (confusion of issues); United States
v. Urquidez, 356 F. Supp. 1363, 1367 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (polygraph debate would consume too
much time). For a discussion of the discretionary standard employed by federal appeilate
courts reviewing the trial court's polygraph decision and its implied relationship to Rule 403
see Comment, supra note 1, at 80 n.47, 83-84 n.66.
10 See notes 140-49 & accompanying text infra.
"I0 See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 207, at n.12: "Judicial reluctance radically to
revamp the legal fact-finding process, especially by entrusting key participation to persons
not under effective judicial control, is no doubt also a factor."
10 See, e.g., United States v. Flores, 540 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1976); Abbell, supra note
5, at 50-51.
Mo FED. R. EVID. 401, 402, 403.
[Vol. 55:157
ADMISSION OF POLYGRAPH RESULTS
instruction."' When coupled with the threshold requirement of a
reliability foundation, this judicial capacity to insulate the jury
suggests that exclusion may be an unreasonable alternative for due
process purposes.
The trial court's consideration should be extended to include the
nature of the burden imposed on the proponent of polygraph evi-
dence. The accused need only raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt."'
Once reliability has been established there is no reason to reject
polygraph results because the jury might find them conclusive. Sci-
entific evidence which is variously estimated to be between sixty
and one hundred percent reliable"6 ought to be sufficient to corro-
borate a defendant's testimony. The defendant's credibility is often
crucial to his case. Where the results offered are found sufficiently
trustworthy at the foundation stage, it hardly seems reasonable to
argue that the combination of an accused's testimony and support-
ing lie detector results cannot legitimately raise that reasonable
doubt.0 7 For example, in a case where the jury is confronted with a
choice between accepting the testimony of the defendant or the
main prosecution witness, it seems unreasonable to exclude evi-
dence which has been deemed reliable and relevant because the
jurors might overvalue it. If one accepts the reliability figures of the
most critical studies, the results which the trial court accepted as
relevant and reliable must reach that minimal level. Therefore, the
overvaluation argument rests on the proposition that jury accept-
ance of the results of a scientific technique that is accurate sixty
percent of the time for the purpose of raising a reasonable doubt is
impermissible because the jury might view these scientific results
as conclusive. A rejection of reliable and critical evidence on those
grounds ignores the ability of the prosecutor and judge to point out
the relative fallibility of the polygraph technique to the jury, under-
estimates the good sense of the jury, 0 ' and cannot pass muster as a
' Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 1005, 1008 (1973 & Supp. 1979).
IM In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); See generally W. LAFAvE & A. ScOTT, HANDBOOK ON
CRANL LAw § 8 (1972).
'" Note, supra note 1, at 116 nn.32 & 33.
See W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 105, § 8 (discussing the meaning of "beyond a
reasonable doubt"). Perhaps the best definition of the burden Qf persuasion that the accused
must meet to raise such doubt is that of Chief Justice Shaw: "It is that state of the case,
which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all of the evidence, leaves the minds
of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral
certainty, of the truth of the charge." Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 295,
320 (1850).
IN See C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 1, § 208 for the suggestion that the stipulation cases may
provide insight into the fact-finder's ability to evaluate polygraph results. But see text ac-
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valid state justification for exclusion.
This conclusion is reinforced by the Advisory Committee's Note
following Rule 403, which advises: "In reaching a decision whether
to exclude on grounds of unfair prejudice, consideration should be
given to the probable effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of a limit-
ing instruction."'' 9 Their opinion suggests that the trial judge seek-
ing to protect the defendant's due process rights ought to pay atten-
tion to reasonable alternatives to exclusion. The Note goes on to
suggest the need to consider "[t]he availability of other means of
proof [which] may also be an appropriate factor.""' This implied
criticality factor, which was part of the Advisory Committee's report
available to the Congress prior to enactment,"' certainly does not
suggest a federal intent to disregard the defendant's needs and ren-
ders a Rule 403 exclusion on overvaluation grounds more unreason-
able as a judicial justification."'
The other primary Rule 403 objection to the admission of relevant
polygraph evidence is the significant expenditure of time required
to conduct a foundation hearing and to present the issue to the
jury."' Given the inherent ability of the trial judge to expedite these
matters, and the recurring imposition of time-consuming proce-
dures on trial courts to protect a defendant's due process rights,"'
it is difficult to expect such a consideration to rise to the level of a
"legitimate interest," to which a defendant's rights must "bow to
accommodate.""11 5 Wherever the law of evidence has developed
companying notes 161-64 infra which condemns postponing utilization of useful evidence at
the expense of the presumptively innocent defendant.
'" FED. R. EVID. 403, Advisory Committee Note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 219 (1973).
1,0 Id.
' Id. See also Preface to FEDERAL RuLEs OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES COUwRS AND
MAGISTRATES (1975).
"I The Advisory Committee Note, supra note 109, stated that " 'unfair prejudice' within
its context means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly,
though not necessarily, an emotional one." 56 F.R.D. at 219. Whether classified under the
label 'unfair prejudice' or 'misleading the jury' the danger of jury overvaluation is not a threat
to logic since a juror certainly can rationally balance reliability statistics against the impre-
cise reasonable doubt standard. Thus, the spectre of overvaluation must be based on the
hypothetical juror's emotive biases, not his cognitive abilities.
M, See, e.g., United States v. Marshall, 526 F.2d 1349, 1360 (9th Cir. 1975); United States
v. Urquidez, 356 F. Supp. 136.3, 1367 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
"I See, e.g., Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 553 (1972) (discussing the due process requirements
for a hearing on the "voluntariness" of a confession); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964);
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 159 (suggesting that such a hearing should be before a judge
other than the trial judge) (citing Owens v. Cavell, 254 F. Supp. 154 (M.D. Pa. 1966)); Hogan
& Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale, and Rescue, 47 GEo. L.J. 1 (1958)
(discussing the requirement of prompt presentation of a defendant before a magistrate).
"I Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973).
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methods to evaluate scientific evidence it has been necessary to
invest judicial time, 116 with the benefits reaped accruing to the fact-
finding process.11 7 The enhancement of reasoned decision is no less
likely to occur from introduction of reliable polygraph evidence than
from other scientific evidence. There is always the possibility that
the defense showing at the foundation will convince the prosecution
to withdraw the charges, as often occurs when there is pre-trial
testing or stipulation."' This would save the time and expense of a
jury trial and partially offset any unusual expenditures required in
the case that goes to jury. Therefore, the overall waste of time in a
jurisdiction might not warrant exclusion absent due process consid-
erations;"9 that factor weighs against the reasonableness of the gov-
ernment's justification in a due process evaluation.
Hughes v. Matthews and Exclusionary Double Standards
A basic anamoly exists in those jurisdictions that accept poly-
graph results upon stipulation but reject the same evidence in any
other situation due to unreliability or irrelevancy, for, "if lie detec-
tor results are unreliable, this defect is not cured by a stipula-
tion." ' Similarly, the jury is no more or less prejudiced or misled
by stipulated evidence than by nonstipulated. The state justifica-
"I See FED. R. Evm. 702, 703 (directing the trial judge regarding his ruling after offer of
expert testimony). See also Romero, supra note 13, at 197.
Although the procedure mandated by Dorsey may seem wasteful of time and
effort, this result is not peculiar to scientific evidence. The admissibility of
evidence is frequently conditioned on a proper foundation. Moreover, this proce-
dure permits the proponent to introduce scientific evidence while at the same
time it allows the opponent to contest its reliability. It is only when there is no
longer any real controversy over the reliability and validity of the scientific
technique that judicial notice makes this procedure unnecessary ....
Id. at 212.
M7 FED. R. EviD. 702 contemplates facilitating the ascertainment of truth, "If scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evi-
dence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
For an admissibility argument for polygraph offers based on their "usefulness" see Axelrod,
supra note 1, at 154.
"I See J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 1, at 332-33 (citing several cases holding a prosecutor
to his promise of dismissal of charges if the defendant "passes" the lie detector test); Axel-
rod, supra note 1, at 155.
"I While Chambers requires a criticality showing, an offer based on a favorable Rule 403
balance does not. Criticality eludes definition, used in a due process sense, when the offered
evidence is not extrinsic but goes to credibility. Almost any case might have turned on the
failure to admit. Thus, this due process, Rule 403 distinction may be meaningless. Criticality
may also be a Rule 403 factor, see notes 110-11 & accompanying text supra.
"I Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 1005, 1008 (1973 & Supp. 1979).
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tion for exclusion on unreliability or irrelevancy grounds in non-
stipulated cases may therefore be viewed as unreasonable.' 2'
Perhaps a contested Dorsey-type hearing requires more time than
is necessary at a stipulation foundation inquiry; that differential
hardly seems sufficient to mandate a Rule 403 exclusion. This is
especially true since the trial judge would be capable of making a
more informed decision if the relative merits of the polygraph re-
sults in the particular case were presented to him through the adver-
sary process. It is also doubtful that the exclusion of relevant poly-
graph evidence based upon the jurisdiction's need to conserve time
could pass constitutional muster as a valid justification for restrict-
ing the defendant's right to present witnesses.
Hughes v. Matthews22 is instructive as a reasoned approach to the
exclusion of evidence as irrelevant and incompetent in violation of
a criminal defendant's due process rights. In Hughes the defense
attempted to introduce psychiatric evidence which would demon-
strate the defendant's lack of the specific intent required for a first-
degree murder conviction in Wisconsin.'1 The circuit court found
that psychiatric evidence was relevant under state law as to
"competency to stand trial" and "on the issue of intent to kill.' 24
Therefore, the court concluded "that in Wisconsin psychiatric testi-
mony is relevant evidence on issues regarding a defendant's mental
state including the question of whether the defendant had the ca-
pacity to form specific as opposed to general intent."'' 5 Turning to
competency, the Seventh Circuit noted the use of psychiatric testi-
mony in other areas of the criminal proceeding and its general scien-
tific acceptance, and found "that psychiatric evidence is generally
considered competent evidence in Wisconsin.""'2 Thus, the court
found a violation of the defendant's right to present evidence be-
cause " 'the state has recognized as relevant and competent the
testimony of this type of witness, but has arbitrarily barred its use
121 See note 150 & accompanying text infra. Compare United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d
161 (8th Cir. 1975) which adamantly opposes admission of unstipulated polygraph results
with United States v. Oliver, 525 F.2d 731 (8th Cir. 1975) which admits stipulated evidence.
In effect, this arbitrary distinction allows the U.S. attorney to make a crucial decision regard-
ing the presentation of the defense. See also Comment, supra note 1, at 89-90.
12 576 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 99 S. Ct. 43 (1978).
12 Id. at 1252.
,2, Id. at 1257.
12 Id.
"26 Id. at 1258. Interestingly, the court cited Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.
1923) for the general acceptance proposition. That standard has long transcended its utiliza-
tion in polygraphy cases. See, e.g., Romero, supra note 13, at 189; notes 2-5 & accompanying
text supra.
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by the defendant.' 127
The court acknowledged that "the right of a defendant to present
relevant and competent evidence is not absolute and may 'bow to
accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial pro-
cess.' "2 They interpreted Chambers to require that "our third step
is to determine whether Wisconsin's justifications for excluding psy-
chiatric testimony on the issue of specific intent withstand close
scrutiny.' 1 9 The Seventh Circuit considered those justifications in-
sufficiently compelling but emphasized the narrowness of its hold-
ing: "Nor have we attempted to further 'constitutionalize' the law
of evidence by constructing a constitutional right to introduce psy-
chiatric testimony.""'3 The Seventh Circuit merely "recognized the
due process right to present relevant and competent evidence in the
absence of a valid state justification for excluding such evidence."'' 3'
Viewed from the perspective provided by Hughes, it seems clear
that those jurisdictions which admit stipulated polygraph results for.
limited purposes should no longer be permitted to exclude the de-
fendant's offer for that same purpose as intrinsically irrelevant. Nei-
ther should they reject polygrapher testimony as inherently unrelia-
ble where they arbitrarily allow a reliability finding in stipulated
cases unless they can justify the dual treatment. 3 2
The Criticality Requirement
According to Chambers, and the subsequent federal cases inter-
preting that decision, the trial court, in addition to determining
reliability, must look to the particular facts of the case presented
to discern the impact of the exclusionary rule on the efficacious
presentation of the defense. It is difficult to predict the fact situa-
tions that might arise wherein that determination should be made.
Dorsey represents a recurring situation in which the defense might
be entirely dependent on the polygraph results to support the defen-
"1 576 F.2d at 1256 (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 25 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
11 Id. at 1258 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295).
12' Id.
', Id. at 1259.
'' Id. In Hughes the offer was the only evidence the defense sought to present. Id. at 1253.
Obviously Chambers' criticality requirement was satisfied although the court failed to men-
tion it. The polygraph results offered by a defendant might be the only evidence available in
certain circumstances to corroborate his testimony. See notes 133-39 & accompanying text
infra.




dant's credibility on crucial issues relating to mitigating factors in
sentencing. Had the trial court's exclusion of polygraph results been
upheld in that case the defendant would have been precluded from
offering relevant evidence corroborating his testimony on the ques-
tions of intent and provocation. That evidence might have been
dispositive in reducing his conviction from second degree murder to
voluntary manslaughter; thus, exclusion could mean the difference
between a ten and a fifty year maximum sentence. 33 To envision an
argument questioning the criticality of the offer is difficult when the
stakes are so high.
As in Dorsey, credibility is always at issue where witnesses testify
before the court. The defendant's credibility is often critical to the
defense and may be directly supported by relevant, reliable poly-
graph results. Two recent federal cases illustrate the crucial need for
determining credibility in a particularly troubling genre of cases.
In Benveniste,1 34 the court decided that declarations against the
penal interest of a third party could be used by the defendant to
sustain his version of the facts and impeach the informant's. Inter-
estingly, the Benveniste decision rejected the defense claim that the
trial court erred in excluding polygraph evidence because there was
no abuse of discretion. Since the review of the trial court's consider-
ation of offered declarations against penal interest applies a similar
standard, the reader might assume that the reliability evaluation of
the two offers by the trial court was adjudged adequate by the Ninth
Circuit in the case of the polygraphy offer and inadequate as to the
hearsay exception. It follows that the Benveniste court considering
the same facts, had they been presented with a record indicating a
mechanistic exclusion of the polygraph evidence or an arbitrary
rejection after a clear reliability showing, would have found an
abuse of the trial court's discretion and upheld the defendant's due
process right to present such evidence, unless there was a valid
governmental justification for such an evidentiary ruling. 35
'3 N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40A-2-1, -3, -29-3B, -3C (2d Repl. Vol. 1972).
'' 564 F.2d 335 (1978). See notes 49-56 & accompanying text supra.
'3 Chambers upheld the defendant's right to present declarations against penal interest,
criticizing Mississippi's "materialistic limitation on the declaration-against-interest," 410
U.S. at 299, despite the dominant distrust of that evidence developed through the experiential
logic of the common law. See Donnely v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1931) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting); C. McCoRPMCK, supra note 1, § 278; J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1477 (Chadbourn
rev. ed. 1974) ("any rule which hampers an honest man in exonerating himself is a bad rule,
even if it also hampers a villain in falsely passing for an innocent"). Rule 804(b)(3), supra
note 55, incorporates a Chambers type balancing but establishes no precise reliability level
for admission. If a court considers polygraph evidence reliability to fall between 60 and 100%
then that level very well might "clearly indicate" trustworthiness.
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Johnson v. Brewer3 ' provides another example of government re-
liance on the incriminatory testimony of a hired informant. The
court discussed the potential for abuse and bias in any such situa-
tion at length, and held that the defendant had a due process right
to present evidence of a prosecutor's admission, in a prior case, that
the same informant who was the chief witness against Johnson had
lied. If the court was willing to suspend the state rule of evidence
excluding testimony on the informant's bias,'37 and to ignore the
example of the recently enacted Federal Rules of Evidence,
608(b), 118 which would also exclude, it would be difficult to under-
stand or accept the exclusion of polygraph evidence in a similar
case.
Where the informant is the only prosecution witness, it is impera-
tive that the defense establish the defendant's credibility and attack
the informant's. Corroboration of the accused through polygraphy
testimony does both and should be admissible for due process rea-
sons if the offer is deemed reliable and the government fails to
articulate a legitimate interest, served by its evidentiary rule, to
override the defendant's constitutionally protected rights. Although
the informer cases are particularly subject to distrust of prosecution
witnesses, a due process right to present polygraphy evidence to
buttress the defendant's credibility should be available whenever
the result may hinge on the fact-finder's acceptance of a defendant's
testimony, and validity of the particular test has been shown. Of
course, admission may depend on the legitimacy of the state's inter-
est in exclusion.
The State Justification for Exclusion
Chambers offers little guidance for determining the extent of the
government's burden to justify its evidentiary rules when a defen-
dant's due process rights are jeopardized. Justice Powell indicated
in dicta, "that the competing [state] interest [ought to] be closely
examined" and declared that only a legitimate state interest could
overbalance the defendant's due process rights.'39 The Court also
admonished, however, that the accused must comply with eviden-
tiary rules that are "designed to assure both fairness and reliabil-
,- 521 F.2d 556 (8th Cir. 1975). For a discussion of the apparent conflict between Johnson
and United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1975) see note 162 infra.
'" Id. at 564 (Van Oosterhourt, J., dissenting).
s Id. See FED. R. Evm. 608(b).
" 410 U.S. at 295. It was unnecessary for the Court to weigh a state justification, however,
since Mississippi offered no defense of its voucher and hearsay rules. Id. at 297.
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ity."140 The state may be required to justify its rule, therefore, by a
showing that it is so designed. Although the opinion did not specifi-
cally articulate a principle that the state's implementation of an
exclusionary rule be reasonable, the Court's criticism of the voucher
rule implied that its fault lay in the lack of a rational justification
for it as an aid to facilitating fairness and reliability in the fact-
finding process. Justice Powell also criticized the failure of the trial
judge to consider the circumstances under which the declarations
against penal interest were offered, since they fell "well within the
basic rationale of the [hearsay] exception."'' Thus, Chambers
could be read not only as invalidating unreasonable rules, such as
the voucher rule, but as precluding unreasonable refusals to apply
rational rules designed to enhance the truth-gathering process, as
exemplified by the declaration against penal interest exception.
This two-tier rationality requirement may be illustrated by subse-
quent cases that relied on Chambers.
Hughes suggested that Wisconsin's reasons would be upheld un-
less arbitrary, but seemed to scrutinize the governmental reasoning
far more stringently than an arbitrariness test would imply. The
Seventh Circuit questioned Wisconsin's "distrust of psychiatric evi-
dence [and prohibition of] admissibility on the issue of intent."''
The court summarized the rationale of the exclusionary principle as
applied in Wisconsin, as a disbelief "in the ability of psychiatry to
define the degree of mental abnormality less than insanity.' 4 3 The
Seventh Circuit criticized "the validity of a system which views
psychiatric testimony as trustworthy evidence as to whether a per-
son is mentally capable of appreciating the wrongfulness of his con-
duct but untrustworthy to express an opinion regarding a person's
mental capacity to form specific intent to kill."'44 They interpreted
the Wisconsin decision "as stating that the true reason for excluding
psychiatric evidence on the issue of intent . . . is the fear that
persons who are legally sane will escape punishment,"'4 and opined
that "[tihis is more of a justification for excluding competent evi-
dence than a reason why the evidence is incompetent."'' The court
110 Id. at 302.
141 Id.
"I Hughes v. Matthews, 576 F.2d 1250, 1257 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 99 S. Ct. 43
(1978). The Seventh Circuit may have applied the arbitrariness standard when discussing
relevance, but appeared to treat Wisconsin's legislative and judicial distrust of "psychiatric
evidence on the intent issue" as unreasonable or illogical. Id. at 1257-58 & n.19.
"' Id. at 1257.
144 Id.
"4 Id. at 1258.
148 Id.
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thus rejected the state's articulated rationale and the "true reason"
for the exclusionary canon in a manner reminiscent of Chambers'
criticism of the voucher rule. Correlatively, Dorsey specifically over-
ruled New Mexico's judicially-formulated rule excluding polygraph
evidence on grounds suggesting the unreasonableness of the rule as
balanced against the legislative intent to enhance the "growth and
development of the law of evidence" in New Mexico.'47 These ap-
proaches reflect the Chambers scrutiny of the underlying rule for
rationality.
Johnson, and other federal decisions that have articulated a rea-
sonableness standard,' have found that the application of exclu-
sionary rules in fact situations that clearly established the reliabil-
ity of the offers, subverted the truthgathering process and were so
unreasonable that the state had no legitimate interest in exclusion.
Their approach follows Chambers' implicit review of the unreason-
able application of a rule.
The court applying this two-tier evaluation should look to the
reasonableness of the rule first, for obviously, a trial judge cannot
apply an unreasonable rule rationally. Then the reviewing court
should look to see whether the trial judge applied the rule reason-
ably or abused his discretion.
Is the Rule Reasonable?
This note takes the position that a reasonable evidentiary rule
will withstand due process scrutiny, but that an exclusionary canon
which ignores the guarantees of reliability in a given fact situation
should be deemed unreasonable. If a defendant's right to a funda-
mentally fair trial is critically affected the rule should be suspended.
"' 88 N.M. 184, 185, 539 P.2d 204, 205. See note 59 & accompanying text supra.
u See Johnson v. Brewer, 521 F.2d 556, 563 (8th Cir. 1975) where the court held:
In holding that in a case like this where a government prosecutor confesses in
open court that the key prosecution witness uses an identical modus operandi
to become the key government witness in another case, where the informant is
a career informant dependent on a continuing relationship with the government,
where several different forms of bias may exist and may exist simultaneously,
the State has an obligation to permit an inquiry into the initial deliberate lie,
we do not fear that we strike even a modest blow against reasonable state rules
of evidence.
Id. (emphasis added).
The facts in Johnson v. Brewer were obviously conducive to overturning the state court's
exclusion of evidence. The point is that the particular situation of the defendant precluded
exclusion because the state's rule was applied unreasonably. See also Steinmark v. Parratt,
427 F. Supp. 931, 940 (D. Neb. 1977) noting that "In so holding, this court, as in Johnson,
has no fear and no intention that it strikes even a modest blow against reasonable state rules
of evidence." (emphasis added).
1979]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
The following examples of government justifications for rejecting
polygraph evidence illustrate the application of that principle.
1. Protecting the Judicial Process from Irrelevant, Unreliable
Evidence
Much has been written concerning the need to protect the jury
from misleading polygraph evidence. Conversely, many commenta-
tors have stressed the utility of the polygraph results in aiding the
fact-finder. 49 If a jurisdiction admits stipulated polygraph evidence
it seems to have accepted the latter premise. It is an arbitrary and
clearly unreasonable exercise of their laws of evidence to reject the
same offer as unreliable or irrelevant when there is no stipulation
and a court applying the due process principle should so hold.
The jurisdiction which admits upon stipulation may justify its
exclusion of a non-stipulated offer on the ground that there is more
likelihood of expert shopping by the defendant or a greater likeli-
hood of erroneous results of unqualified polygraphers reaching the
jury if there has been no prior stipulation. Since the function of the
reliability hearing is to filter out generally suspect offers in the
stipulation cases, however, is unreasonable for the jurisdiction to
refuse to perform the same function where these specific dangers
might be evaluated.
Chambers teaches that a jurisdiction may not simply exclude all
evidence of one type because some of it is unreliable, unless there
is a legitimate state interest furthered by such a rule. Therefore,
those jurisdictions which disallow polygraph evidence regardless of
stipulation cannot mechanistically apply outmoded case law to an
individual offer, without regard to its trustworthiness foundation,
absent a valid justification. Since reliability testing is so prevalent
and a fair hearing on the trustworthiness issue adequately protects
the defendant, it would be unreasonable to deny the defendant's
right to present witnesses without some review of the relative valid-
ity of the offered testimony.
Congress and the state legislatures might enact such rules codify-
ing the exclusionary principle, either at the instance of the judiciary
or of their own accord. A federal court should defer to such a legisla-
tive determination if it is reasonable and considers the question of
polygraph evidence generically, while rejecting its reliability or rele-
" See generally J. REm & F. INBAU, supra note 1; Tarlow, Admissibility of Polygraph
Evidence, 26 HASTiNGS L.J. 917 (1975); Note, supra note 10, at 1138; Note, supra note 1, at
126.
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vancy, since the obvious purpose of that decision would be that
forum's interest in its judicial system. If, however, the adoption of
such an exclusionary rule were clearly arbitrary or unreasonable,
perhaps relying on outmoded decisional law, the defendant's rights
might prevail as they did in Chambers. There appears to be no
specific statute in any American jurisdiction which expressly forbids
the introduction of polygraph evidence nor one that governs its
admission.150
The analogous area of rape shield legislation has elicited some
critical commentary suggesting that the legislative decision'5' reject-
ing prior sexual history or prior reputation testimony concerning the
victim is suspect under Chambers' due process analysis.'5 2 Where
the legislative rationale for exclusion rests on formulations external
to the primary protective considerations surrounding the trial pro-
cess, such as rape shield laws,'53 it has been argued that the defen-
dant's interest should prevail where lack of opportunity to cross-
examine or introduce evidence would substantially lessen his ability
to defend. Where the exclusion rests on legislative or judicial con-
cern for the continued viability of the fact-finding system, as the
juridical rejection of polygraph results often seems to,'54 a due pro-
" J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 1, at 321 & n.47. See also Tarlow, supra note 150
(commenting on the failure of the California legislature to pass a comprehensive polygraph
evidence regulation in 1973 and expressing the hope that the bill will be enacted); Axelrod,
supra note 1, at 137.
5I See CAL. EvED. CODE § 1103(2) (West Supp. 1979); MICH. Comp,. LAws ANN. § 750.520(j)
(Supp. 1979).
5 See Note, 3 HoFsTRA L. Ray., supra note 20; Wynn, supra note 20.
" Rape shield laws are generally designed to protect victims who will thereby be encour-
aged to prosecute their attackers. Wynn, supra note 20, at 444; Note, 3 HoFsTRA L. REV., supra
note 20, at 407. The Michigan courts have consistently rejected a due process attack. See
People v. Patterson, 79 Mich. App. 393, 262 N.W.2d 835 (1978); People v. Dawsey, 76 Mich.
App. 741, 257 N.W.2d 236 (1977); People v. Thompson, 76 Mich. App. 705, 257 N.W.2d'268
(1977). Judge Cavanagh, concurring in Patterson, argued that the statute should be sus-
pended in the critical situation if relevancy were shown. He found no basis for the state
justification mentioned above that would outweigh the defendant's rights. He viewed the
balance to be struck as between probative value and prejudice to the prosecution in its
statewide effort to encourage rape victims to come forward. 79 Mich. App. at 394-402, 262
N.W.2d at 836-44.
The relevancy factoring of an exclusionary rule may take place either at a legislative or trial
court level. See note 151 & accompanying text supra. If that determination is not adverse to
the probity of the evidence at the legislative level Judge Cavanagh's concurrence suggests
slight deference to that policy determination where the accused's constitutional rights are
involved. While this note articulates a reasonableness standard when examining the exclu-
sionary rule's protection of the judicial process it does not reach the issue concerning the
burden of justification the state must carry to vindicate a policy decision which may infringe
on the defendant's rights.
I5 See, e.g., C. MCCORMCK, supra note 1, § 208 n.12.
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cess scrutiny should be even more severe since there are practical
alternatives for protecting that interest.
2. Saving Time and Money
Many courts and commentators fear an inordinate waste of time
and money if the courts are compelled to consider the polygraph
issue at both the foundation and presentation stages. As mentioned
above, this suggestion rings hollow in those jurisdictions where stip-
ulated results are admissible, especially since that evidence is often
contested at both stages by the party for whom the results are un-
favorable. Even in a jurisdiction which maintains internal consis-
tency by uniformly rejecting lie detector evidence, it seems inappro-
priate to require a defendant's due process rights, which have
gradually evolved to necessitate various costly and time-consuming
procedural devices, to bow to the judiciary's money and manpower
constraints. Whether its source is judicial or legislative, it seems
clear that such a justification cannot, by itself, overcome the de-
fendant's right to a fundamentally fair trial.
3. Lack of Mutuality
Another objection to the introduction of polygraph evidence by
the defendant is the lack of concomitant privileges for the prosecu-
tion. This problem is avoided in stipulation jurisdictions where both
parties must agree to admissibility before the test is conducted.
Thus, any jurisdiction might well seek to justify its exclusionary rule
by this lack of mutuality."'5
If the reason for rejection is the potential unreliability of the
polygrapher whom the prosecutor does not agree to before the test,
then the solution least disruptive of the defendant's rights inheres
in the state's ability to attack the validity of the test during the
trial. Furthermore, as a practical matter the defense counsel would
be likely to seek a reputable examiner, one well-respected by the
legal community. 55
It is clear that the defendant's fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination precludes any reciprocal government-compelled poly-
graph examination. 57 No valid state justification for abridging the
"' See Axelrod, supra note 1, at 143.
"' It would be difficult for a prosecutor to question the reliability of a polygrapher whom
he had previously used in investigations or stipulations.
-5 See, e.g., Axelrod, supra note 1, at 145 ("there appears to be acknowledgement that a
defendant could not be forced to take a lie detector test without fifth amendment conse-
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due process right to present witnesses could reasonably be fashioned
out of the disability.of the prosecution to force a lie detector test
upon the accused. Wherever the polygraph evidence is offered to
corroborate the defendant's credibility, the main purpose envi-
sioned here, the waiver of that fifth amendment right would enable
the prosecution to test the defendant's veracity in the traditional
manner, in addition to challenging the polygraphy examination it-
self. Where the defendant submits to a prosecution-sponsored ex-
amination, if there are no constitutional infirmities, there is no rea-
son for a court to reject those results unless the defense successfully
challenges their reliability or relevancy or persuades the court to
strike a Rule 403 balance against the offer.'
The public's interest in punishing. criminals has traditionally
been viewed as consistent with its interest, reflected in the fifth
amendment, in protecting the innocent; a fundamentally fair trial
accomplishes both objectives. The function of the prosecutor is to
seek justice, not convictions. "' It is antithetical to that purpose to
limit the defendant's right to defend simply because the state can-
not exercise the same privilege due to another constitutional prohi-
bition.
CONCLUSION
An application of due process piinciples to the admissibility of
polygraph evidence is an appropriate extension of Chambers and
quences"); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966); accord, United States v. Zieger,
350 F. Supp. 685, 692 n.33 (D.D.C.) (dictum), reo'd per curiam, 475 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
For a comment on voluntary testing of suspects see Burkey, supra note 16, at 857: "To the
frequent suggestion that suspects should be permitted 'voluntarily' to take lie tests, the
committee replied that as long as notations are made in any official file on an individual that
he has refused to take a polygraph test, the examination is in no sense 'voluntary'" (refer-
ring to H.R. Doc. No. 198, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1965)). "All too often a refusal to take a
test is regarded as additional evidence of guilt." Id.; see also Romero, supra note 13, at 189
n.9 for commentary on the fifth amendment and polygraph tests. Cf., Skolnick, Scientific
Theory and Scientific Evidence: An Analysis of Lie Detection, 70 YALE L.J. 694, 695 (1961)
(possible fourth amendment problems).
113 See notes 105-12 & accompanying text supra. It is possible that a court might be per-
suaded that the danger of jury overvaluation is more acute when evidence that may be only
60% reliable might be conclusive of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
' See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935):
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to
a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a




necessary to protect the criminal defendant. Cases following
Chambers have found due process violations where single exclusions
have occurred; the fundamental nature of the right to present evi-
dence mandates the same conclusion where lie detector tests are
offered, if Chambers' other criteria are satisfied. Methods are avail-
able to evaluate the reliability of the particular polygraph offer and
to balance the relevancy of that evidence against its potential for
perverting the truthgathering process. Further safeguards inhere in
the prosecution's opportunity to argue the trustworthiness question
before the jury, and in the trial judge's ability to limit the jury's use
of that testimony by instruction. The necessity of the evidence to
the defense is a factual determination with which Chambers and
subsequent federal cases have had little difficulty.
Upon the resolution of the reliability and criticality issues in the
defendant's favor the government has every opportunity to demon-
strate its reason for exclusion despite the defendant's due process
rights. Naturally, the state's interest in exclusion must withstand
some level of scrutiny when invoked to outweigh a fundamental
constitutional right. A requirement of rationality coupled with at-
tention to less intrusive alternatives adequately balances those con-
siderations.
Before Chambers, deference to a state's evidentiary process was
virtually absolute. This abdication of judicial responsibility to pro-
tect due process rights was halted by Chambers and its progeny.
Any interest the jurisdiction has in preserving its fact-finding insti-
tutions from suspect evidence, in the form of polygraph results, is
sufficiently protected by the procedural safeguards articulated her-
ein, and any external rationale for exclusion must be closely scruti-
nized to guarantee the criminal defendant a fair trial.
[A]verages in the administration of justice do not avail the
person who is wronged grievously in his own, particular case.
The appeal to time and patience may assist in evolving better
concepts and techniques for future use of the profession, but it
cannot excuse or exonerate our sending an innocent man to the
penitentiary here and now. Enlightenment tomorrow or else-
where will not serve, for his destiny rests in our hands today, and
our sense of injustice (for that is what I call it) forbids us to be
patient at his cost.' 0
It would be comforting to have a scientific technique which could
unquestionably establish a defendant's innocence because of uni-
,60 Cahn, The Consumers of Injustice, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rsv. 1166, 1176 (1959).
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versal acceptance of its absolute reliability. ' As Edmund Calm
points out, however, until that time arrives, if it ever does, criminal
defendants need the protection of the judicial system. Our legal
heritage is replete with corroboration of a basic tenet of Anglo-
American criminal law; the accused must be protected throughout
the criminal process because the system is ideologically committed
to, and better served by, protecting the innocent than by convicting
the guilty.16 2 When we view the presumptively innocent defendant's
attempt to exonerate himself by corroborative polygraph results
from this perspective it is difficult to discover dispositive grounds
for denying him that right. When combined with the availability of
procedural and adversarial safeguards creatively formulated to pro-
tect the judicial process, the rationale, for withholding that right
seems even less persuasive.
When the Chambers' criticality requirement is fulfilled the trial
court should consider the due process criteria satisfied by a proper
foundation demonstrating reliability and relevancy and undertake
a balancing of the government's interest in excluding against the
defendant's due process right to a fair trial. Unless that state inter-
est is not susceptible to less intrusive methods of polygraph evidence
M" "If there is ever devised a psychological test for the valuation of witnesses, the law will
run to meet it." J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 875 (2d ed. 1923); see also United States v. Alexan-
der, 526 F.2d 161, 167 (8th Cir. 1975) which states:
If we were satisfied in our own minds about the scientific reliability of poly-
graph tests and the integrity and responsibility of the examiners to the extent
of an almost unimpeachable result, we would eagerly acknowledge the reliability
of the machine and embrace its use in court proceedings in the absence of
stipulation by the parties.
If due process requires admission of evidence bearing "persuasive assurances of trustworthi-
ness," then it would seem that the near certainty requirement, as articulated in Alexander,
would violate the defendant's rights. See Axelrod, supra note 1, at 143. Neither FED. R. Evm.
804(b)(3), supra note 55, nor 702, supra note 117, nor 403, supra note 48, require such cer-
tainty. Alexander is a leading modem case rejecting polygraph testimony. The exclusion of
the results was critical to the defendant since his credibility was directly in conflict with that
of the main prosecution witness, 526 F.2d at 162, see notes 133-39 & accompanying text supra.
It is difficult to reconcile Alexander with Johnson v. Brewer, 521 F.2d 556 (8th Cir. 1975),
discussed supra notes 137-39, where the same circuit upheld a defendant's due process right.
Had the Alexander court been faced with a due process challenge perhaps their result would
have reflected Edmund Cahn's concern for the individual defendant.
is John Adams, in defense of British soldiers accused of perpetrating the Boston massacre,
stated the proposition thusly,
[I]t may be proper to recollect with what temper the law requires we should
proceed. . . we find it laid down by the greatest English judges. . . we are to
look upon it as more beneficial that many guilty persons should escape unpun-
ished than one innocent person should suffer. The reason is because it is of more
importance to the community that innocence be protected than it is that guilt
should be punished.
P. SMITH, JoHN ADAMS 124 (1962).
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evaluation, blanket exclusionary rules should be suspended where
due process requires. The "legitimate interest" which is required
before the defendant's rights may be forced to "bow to accommo-
date""'3 has yet to be articulated by the cases and commentary
rejecting polygraph evidence.
THoMAs K. DowNs
163 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973).
